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Britain and the Confrontation with Indonesia, 1960-66

Autor David Easter
en Limba Engleză Paperback – 16 mar 2012
The confrontation with Indonesia cut to the heart of Britain's desire to retain global power status in the 1960s and was central to decolonisation and British defence policy across South-East Asia. Factors such as the need to maintain a military base in Singapore drove strategy and this confrontation became a major commitment - close at times to escalating into full-scale regional war. However, 'the Confrontation' was not recorded as a conflict of this scale, and Britain was cast into a passive and defensive role. Here, David Easter reveals a radically different view, persuasively making the case that Britain waged a secret and aggressive war against President Sukarno's Indonesia. It was the covert nature of operations and the deliberate decision of British policy-makers to keep the full extent of this conflict away from public scrutiny that has allowed it to be overshadowed in the annals of history.
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Specificații

ISBN-13: 9781848859692
ISBN-10: 1848859694
Pagini: 256
Dimensiuni: 138 x 216 x 15 mm
Greutate: 0.32 kg
Editura: Bloomsbury Publishing
Colecția I.B.Tauris
Locul publicării:London, United Kingdom

Notă biografică

David Easter is a Tutorial Fellow at the London School of Economics in the University of London.

Cuprins

Introduction1 The decision to form Malaysia, 1960-January 19622 The Brunei revolt and the start of Confrontation, January 1962-April 19633 Pressing ahead with Malaysia, April-September 19634 Coping with the Confrontation, September 1963-April 19645 Escalation and rethink, May-October 19646 Labour and Confrontation, October 1964-March 19657 Exit Singapore, April-September 19658 The coup attempt in Indonesia, September 1965-January 19669 Ending the Confrontation, January-August 1966Conclusion